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The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards
JAMAL GREENE*

Justice Antonin Scalia titled his 1989 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at
Harvard Law School The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules.' The lecture posed the
sort of dichotomy that has become a familiar feature of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence and of his general approach to judging. On one hand are judges who
recognize that the only legitimate means by which they may adjudicate cases in
a democracy is to seek to do so through rules of general application. 2 On the
other hand are those judges who generally prefer to adopt an all-thingsconsidered balancing approach to adjudication. This latter species of judge is
akin, he says, to King Solomon, deciding difficult constitutional questions based
on some judge-empowering intuition.4
This dichotomy is familiar in both the literature and the case law. In her 1991
Harvard Law Review foreword, Kathleen Sullivan memorably distinguished
between a "[j]ustice of rules" and a "[j]ustice of standards."5 A justice of rules
prefers to issue legal directives that "bind[] a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts."6 The key word
in this formulation is "delimited"-as Sullivan writes, "the rule's force as a rule
is that decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the background
principle or policy [that the rule captures] to the facts would produce a different
result."7 A justice of standards prefers "to collapse decisionmaking back into the
direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation."8
Sullivan notes that the distinction in constitutional law between categorical
approaches and balancing approaches is "a version of the rules/standards distinction."9
It is clear to me, and has been clear to much of the U.S. legal community at
least since Craig v. Boren,o that as a general matter, Justice Stevens is much

* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. @ 2011, Jamal Greene. Rosalind Dixon,
Jeffrey Fisher, David Fontana, and Elora Mukherjee provided valuable comments and suggestions. I
would like to thank Justice John Paul Stevens, for whom I served as a law clerk during the 2006-07
Supreme Court Term. I trust I violate no privilege in remarking that if you don't like Justice Stevens,
you just don't like people.
1. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1175 (1989).
2. See id. at 1176-77.
3. See id.

4. See id. at 1176 ("King Solomon is also supposed to .have done a pretty good job, without benefit
of a law degree, dispensing justice case-by-case.").
5. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 121 (1992).
6. Id. at 58.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 59.
10. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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more a justice of standards than a justice of rules." In his concurring opinion in
Craig,which invalidated an Oklahoma law that distinguished between men and
women in setting the drinking age for certain low-alcohol beverages, 12 Justice
Stevens departed from the "tiers-of-scrutiny" doctrinal formulation that divided
the majority from the dissenters.13 He wrote:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern
impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in
some cases and a different standard in other cases. ...
I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered
analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logical
method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed to
explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion. 14
Several times after Craig, which was decided in his first full Term on the
Court, Justice Stevens reiterated his view that the Equal Protection Clause is
and should be applied contextually on a case-by-case basis.' 5 That view is
representative of a broader opposition to adjudication based on one-size-fits-all
rules. In his valedictory opinion, dissenting in. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
Justice Stevens wrote that in adjudicating claims to substantive rights under the
Due Process Clause, "we have eschewed attempts to provide any all-purpose,
top-down, totalizing theory of 'liberty.' That project is bound to end in failure or
worse."1 6 Ever the common law judge, facts matter to Justice Stevens; for him,
a single standard might be applied differently in different factual contexts in
order to further the underlying purposes of a given constitutional or statutory

11. See, e.g., James E. Fleming, "There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause":An Appreciation of
Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence,74 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2301 ("With [his] words
[in Craig], he served notice that ... he was to be ... a 'justice of standards' as distinguished from a
'justice of rules."' (quoting Sullivan, supra note 5)). Sullivan refers to Justice Stevens as Justice
Scalia's "standard-bearing antagonist." Sullivan, supranote 5, at 88.
12. 429 U.S. at 191-92.
13. Justice Brennan's majority opinion employed what has become known as intermediate scrutiny,
see Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (requiring gender classifications to "serve important governmental objectives" and to be "substantially related to achievement of those objectives"), whereas Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist argued that rational basis review is appropriate, id. at 217 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[S]ince eight Members of the Court think the means not irrational, I see no basis for
striking down the statute as violative of the Constitution simply because we find it unwise, unneeded, or
possibly even a bit foolish."); id. at 217-18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I think the Oklahoma statute
challenged here need pass only the 'rational basis' equal protection analysis . . .
14. Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 800 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's misuse of the three-tiered approach to Equal Protection analysis
merely reconfirms my own view that there is only one such Clause in the Constitution."); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("I have never
been persuaded that these so-called [tiers-of-scrutiny] 'standards' adequately explain the decisional
process.").
16. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3100 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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text. "

It is easy to caricature this approach as lawless. Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote
in McDonald that when judges follow Justice Stevens's suggestion that their
"own reasoned judgment" guide them in due process cases, it "basically means
picking the rights we want to protect and discarding those we do not."' 8 A
glance outside our borders confirms, however, that many of the world's leading
constitutional courts do not view standards-based adjudication, or the judicial
balancing that often accompanies it, as inconsistent with the rule of law. To the
contrary, many of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the
courts of Canada, Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into forms of proportionality analysis.' 9
As practiced by most of the courts that employ it, proportionality analysis
constitutes a formalized approach to balancing; it is not balancing simpliciter.
Typically, it asks first whether the rights claimant has made out a prima facie
case. This is usually quite easily satisfied. 20 The analysis then proceeds through
a series of threshold stages that test the legality of government action. We can
identify a substantive legality inquiry that addresses whether the government is
17. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126-27 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (praising the Court for refusing to adopt a per se rule governing the permissibility of
detaining someone who flees at the sight of a police car); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 751-61
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating a totality of the circumstances approach in political
gerrymandering challenges). One evident exception to Justice Stevens's general preference for standards over rules is his Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. He joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Crawford v. Washington, which established a bright-line rule that a criminal defendant must be given
the opportunity to test all testimonial statements used against him through confrontation. 541 U.S. 36,
68 (2004). More conspicuously, Justice Stevens has led the charge in favor of a bright-line rule
requiring every fact that raises a criminal defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the
offense to be found by a jury under a reasonable doubt standard. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243-44 (2005) (applying Apprendi's
rule to the federal sentencing guidelines); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 299-301 (2004)
(joining Justice Scalia's majority opinion, which applied Apprendi's rule to a state sentencing guidelines scheme). The apparent inconsistency might be explained by arguing-as is fitting, contextuallythat constitutional provisions whose structure is more rule-like call for more a rule-based doctrine. That
explanation will in some cases be question-begging, but the distinction is most defensible in those
cases-involving equal protection and substantive due process-in which Justice Stevens has been
most consistently opposed to rules. If any constitutional provisions are meet for a standards-based
jurisprudence, they are the exceptionally broad Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3100 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that his approach to the Due
Process Clause avoids "a rigid, context-independent definition of a constitutional guarantee that was
deliberately framed in open-ended terms"); see also ROBElr ALExy, A THEORY OF CONSTfuTIONAL RIGHTS

57 (Julian Rivers trans., 2002) (distinguishing between rules, which "insist that one does exactly as
required" unless impossible, and principles, which "require that something be realized to the greatest
extent legally and factually possible" and which "lack the resources to determine their own extent in the
light of competing principles and what is factually possible" (emphasis added)).
18. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. VIcKI C. JACKSON, CONsTrruTIoNAL ENGAGEMENT INA TRANSNATIONAL ERA 60 (2010).
20. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, All Things in Proportion?:American Rights Doctrine
and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 7), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1569351 ("No important claim will ever be rejected at this stage.").
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pursuing a legitimate objective to which its acts are rationally related, and a
procedural legality stage that addresses whether it is pursuing that objective
through the least rights-infringing among reasonably available means. 2' A final
step is often called "balancing in the strict sense," which entails weighing the
legitimate government objective against the burdening of the right, in order to
complete the analysis. 2 2 There is considerable diversity in the extent to which
jurisdictions focus on the legality stages of the analysis as compared to the
balancing stage.2 3
Proportionality analysis is also commonly described as trans-substantive,
meaning it applies across rights adjudication, not just, for example, in equality
cases. 24 Even as various jurisdictions necessarily tailor the analysis.to different
sorts of government acts and different kinds of rights,2 5 proportionality analysis
remains notionally trans-substantive-there is only one Constitution, it seems to
say. That distinguishes proportionality analysis from the tiers-of-scrutiny review
that is a familiar feature of American case law. Under standard proportionality
formulations, a similar analysis applies across a range of rights, whereas the
American approach typically tailors the doctrinal test to the right that has been
identified. 2 6 As a rough cut, we can describe proportionality as an across-theboard form of intermediate scrutiny.27
Here is neither the place to defend proportionality analysis as a general

21. See id.
22. See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, ProportionalityBalancingand Global Constitutionalism,
47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 75 (2008).
23. See, e.g., Dieter Grimm, Proportionalityin Canadianand German ConstitutionalJurisprudence,

57 U. TORONTO L.J. 383, 384 (2007) ("[Iun Canada, most laws that fail to meet the [proportionality] test
do so in the second step, . . . whereas in Germany, the third step has become the most decisive part of
the proportionality test.").
24. See DAVID M. BEAf, THE ULTIMArE RULE OF LAw 160 (2004) ("In all areas of government
regulation, no matter the nature of the right or freedom that is alleged to have been violated, and
regardless of the personal characteristics of those bringing the case, ... the test is always the same.");
Sweet & Mathews, supra note 20 (manuscript at 12) ("[Proportionality analysis] offers judges the
possibility of building trans-substantive coherence, since it can be applied across the board, to virtually
all disputes involving rights.").
25. See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 994, 999-1000 (Can.) (deferring
to the government's conclusion that it had a "reasonable basis" for concluding that its chosen means
minimally impaired the claimed right at issue, where the Court considered infringement of the right to
be insubstantial); Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality ofAmerican ConstitutionalExceptional-

ism, 107 MIcH. L. REV. 391, 418 (2008) (noting that the German and South African constitutional
courts, as well as the European Court of Human Rights, vary the stringency of their proportionality
tests with the significance of the right).
26. See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 20 (manuscript at 9) ("In the United States ... strict scrutiny
is only applied to a small number of rights . . . ."); cf id. (manuscript at 45) (arguing that the Court's
tiers-of-scrutiny approach "treat[s] a rights provision as either de facto absolute or de facto without
force").
27. In referring to intermediate scrutiny, I refer to the vast salmagundi of doctrinal tests that fall
between the rational basis standard of Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955),
and the strict scrutiny test specified in cases involving governmental racial discrimination, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). I do not mean the specific intermediate scrutiny
formulation used in sex discrimination cases since Craig.
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approach to judging, nor to litigate whatever challenges may inhere in applying
that analysis as it has been conducted around the world to the American
context. 2 8 What I do wish to highlight, however, are the ways in which the
distinctive features of proportionality analysis, and indeed the features that
make proportionality analysis consistent with the rule of law, dovetail with
much of the rights jurisprudence of Justice Stevens.2 9 Proportionality analysis is
interesting not because it contemplates balancing in the strict sense, which I
presume to be a feature of all of the world's constitutional courts, but because it
does so only after requiring the government to justify its actions by reference to
a limited set of objectives and procedural options. 3 0 These distinctive features
aim for rule of law in the strictest sense-that is, the sense in which we mean to
reduce the discretion of the entire government, and not just of judges."
First, consider what I have called substantive legality. In many proportionality jurisdictions the significance of the governmental objective is not simply pro
forma or hypothetical, as in the rational basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical.3 2 Rather, that objective must sound in a constitutional register. Thus, in
Canada, whose Oakes test33 is much imitated internationally, 34 the reason for
the government's rights violation must "relate to concerns which are pressing
and substantial in a free and democratic society."3 5 The particular language of
the Canadian formulation derives from the language of section 1 of the Charter

28. Compare Sweet & Mathews, supra note 20 (manuscript at 74-82) (urging the Supreme Court to
develop an American version of proportionality analysis), with Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, The
Hidden ForeignLaw Debate in Heller: The ProportionalityApproach in American ConstitutionalLaw,

46 SAN DEGo L. REv. 367, 399 (2009) (arguing that proportionality analysis is incompatible with
American skepticism of judges).
29. Justice Stevens has not to my knowledge offered any explicit endorsement of proportionality
analysis. Justice Breyer has referred approvingly to "proportionality" in ways that make clear his
familiarity with the transnational discourse on the subject. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 689-90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OuR DEMocRAcY WoRK: A
JUDGE's Vtuw 163-64 (2010).

30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
31. David Beatty has called proportionality "the ultimate rule of law" because he believes it "is an
integral, indispensable part of every constitution that subordinates the system of government it creates
to the rule of law." BEAT=Y, supra note 24, at 163. But see Richard A. Posner, ConstitutionalLaw from a
PragmaticPerspective,55 U. ToRoNTo L.J. 299, 301 (2005) (contesting Beatty's claim of the universality of proportionality).
32. See Williamson, 348 U.S. at 487-89.

33. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-40 (Can.).
34. See Sujit Choudhry, So What Is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality
Analysis Under the Canadian Charter's Section 1, 34 Sup. CT. L. REv. (2d) 501, 502 (2006) ("The

citation of Oakes by courts in Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Fiji, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel,
Jamaica, Namibia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe has made Oakes one of
the central models for rights-based constitutional adjudication ..... (footnotes omitted)).
35. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138. The German Constitutional Court does not require more than a
"legitimate purpose" at what I have referred to as the legality stage of the analysis, but the importance
of the governmental purpose is assessed at the balancing stage. See Grimm, supra note 23, at 388. Still,
as Donald Kommers writes, in contrast to the United States, "[blecause rights in the Basic Law are
circumscribed by duties and are often limited by objectives and values specified in the constitutional
text, the Constitutional Court receives considerable guidance in determining the legitimacy of a state
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of Rights and Freedoms, which subjects rights guaranteed therein to "such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society." 3 6 Among the values the Supreme Court of Canada has
said are sufficiently "pressing and substantial" are "respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity,
and faith in social and political institutions which enhance the participation of
individuals and groups in society."3 1
Justice Stevens's view of which governmental objectives count as legitimate
has long been both demanding and unorthodox from the perspective of American jurisprudence. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, which
upheld Georgia's anti-sodomy law, 3 8 he argued that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." 39 Justice
White's majority opinion countered that assertion with the memorable line,
"The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." 40 Justice White might be
correct, but he misses the point, and in so doing he helps to make Justice
Stevens's argument. It is precisely because so many laws have (or could be said
to have) substantially moral elements that some justification beyond morality is
necessary to confer legality upon governmental action. That additional justification must be grounded in governmental objectives that do not simply assume
away the problem of rights infringement-in a constitutional democracy that
protects all of its constituent subjects, the government's aim cannot be to
discriminate. 4 '
Consider also Justice Stevens's views on religious establishment, which are
more skeptical of the government than those of perhaps any other Justice in the
Court's history.42 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, for example, the
Court considered, among other things, whether a Missouri statute could permis-

purpose." DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

GERMANY 46 (2d ed. 1997).
36. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 (U.K.).
37. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 136.
38. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

40. Id. at 196 (majority opinion).
41. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) ('[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal
protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest."' (alteration in original) (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973))); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
520 n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[P]ure discrimination is most certainly not a 'legitimate
purpose' for our Federal Government . . . .").
42. Cf Michael Stokes Paulsen, Counting Heads on RFRA, 14 CONsT. COMMENT. 7, 17 (1997)
("Stevens ... is implacably hostile to religion, in a way that seems to go beyond jurisprudence.").
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sibly state in its preamble that human life begins at conception.4 3 Dissenting
from a holding allowing the preamble to stand," Justice Stevens wrote for
himself alone that the language violated the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause because it "serves no identifiable secular purpose."4 5 Justice Stevens was
also the sole Justice who believed that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which sought to require courts to apply a strict scrutiny standard to claims of
infringement on religious liberty,4 6 violated the Establishment Clause because it
constituted a "governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion."4 7
Finally, take Justice Stevens's distinction between forward-looking affirmative action plans that ostensibly benefit society as a whole, the constitutionality
of which he generally supports, and backward-looking plans designed to compensate for past harm, which he has generally found wanting. 48 That view, like his
view on religious establishment and his disapproval of public morality as a
legitimate governmental interest, is nontraditional, and has contributed to the
erstwhile perception of Justice Stevens as a judicial maverick. But Justice
Stevens's articulation of the values that pass muster as governmental objectives
in rights-infringing cases overlap substantially with the values the Supreme
Court of Canada has concluded are "pressing and substantial."4 9 In each of the
aforementioned cases, we can reframe Justice Stevens's concern as a demand
that the government justify its coercive, activities in a way that presumptively
treats each member of society-gay or straight, religious or atheist, black.or
white-with equal concern."o As he wrote in McDonald, the "conceptual core"
of the Due Process Clause "safeguards, most basically, 'the ability independently to define one's identity,' 'the individual's right to make certain unusually
important decisions that will affect his own, or his family's, destiny,' and the
right to be respected as a human being."5 1 Significantly, that core not only

43. 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989).
44. Id. at 507.
45. Id. at 566-67 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997).
47. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring).
48. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601-02 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (endorsing
the Court's "focus on the future benefit, rather than the remedial justification" of government decisions
involving racial classifications), overruled by Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) ("I believe the Constitution requires us to evaluate our policy decisions-including
those that govern the relationships among different racial and ethnic groups-primarily by studying
their probable impact on the future."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Rather than analyzing a case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers
have some sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past, I
believe that we should first ask whether the Board's action advances the public interest in educating
children for the future.").
49. See supra notes 35, 37 and accompanying text.
50. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal
Membership, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2177, 2184 (2006).
51. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3101 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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defines substantive individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but is a
fundamental constraint on the government's objectives when it acts in a way
that implicates those rights: the requirement of legality is what prevents substantive due process from being an oxymoron.5 2
The second element of legality I have referred to as procedural. In Canada
this takes the form of the so-called minimal impairment test: a challenged law
must impair a protected right "as little as is reasonably possible."53 For the
German Constitutional Court, the means chosen to achieve a law's purpose
must be necessary, in the sense that it has the least restrictive effect on a
constitutional value, as compared to other measures that may achieve the same
objective. Necessary does not mean necessary; the court gives some deference
to the legislature in choosing appropriate means. 55 American jurists are familiar
with this kind of means-ends testing, as it is a standard feature of heightened
scrutiny analysis.
Justice Stevens has shown a special interest in scrutinizing the basic rationality of the fit between the government's means and its legitimate purposes. The
most conspicuous example is his death penalty jurisprudence. In arguing in
Baze v. Rees that the death penalty is unconstitutional, he did not advance a
moral or otherwise essentialist argument but rather argued that capital punishment as actually practiced in the United States-remember, facts matter-is
neither necessary nor in some cases sufficient to serve the purposes for which
the Court has permitted it (incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution).5 7 For
Justice Stevens, democratic deliberation must in fact be deliberative when
significant rights are at stake. And in Baze, he was concerned that
current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the United States,
and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the
product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process
that weighs the costs and risks of administering that penalty against its
identifiable benefits. 58
Likewise, Justice Stevens viewed the specific administration of a three-drug
lethal injection protocol that uses a pain-masking paralytic agent as the disturb-

52. See id. at 3090-91 (calling substantive due process "consonant with the venerable 'notion that
governmental authority has implied limits which preserve private autonomy,' a notion which predates
the founding and which finds reinforcement in the Constitution's Ninth Amendment" (footnote omitted)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("[Tihe word 'rational'-for me at least-includes elements of legitimacy and neutrality that must
always characterize the performance of the sovereign's duty to govern impartially.").
53. R. v.Edwards Books, [19861 2 S.C.R. 713, 772 (Can.).
54. KoMMEs, supra note 35.
55. See Grimm, supra note 23, at 390.
56. See Sweet & Mathews, supra note 20 (manuscript at 41).
57. 553 U.S. 35, 78-81 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 78.
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ing result of legislative inertia rather than reasoned argument:
Even in those States where the legislature specifically approved the use of a
paralytic agent, review of the decisions that led to the adoption of the
three-drug protocol has persuaded me that they are the product of "'administrative convenience' and a "stereotyped reaction" to an issue, rather than a
careful analysis of relevant considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion. 59
In another sign of Justice Stevens's startling methodological continuity, the
language just quoted from Baze, which was decided near the end of his tenure
on the Court, borrowed directly from the language of his vigorous dissenting
opinion in Mathews v. Lucas,6 0 which was argued twenty-five days after his
investiture. The decision upheld a presumption of dependency under the Social
Security Act that distinguished between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children. 6 1 For Justice Stevens, this unfair classification could not be justified on the
stated basis of "administrative convenience" because it was both overinclusive
and underinclusive. 62 He wrote: "I believe an admittedly illogical and unjust
result should not be accepted without both a better explanation and also
something more than a 'possibly rational' basis."6 This was not a call for the
application of strict scrutiny or some other categorical doctrinal device, but
simply a demand for the government to offer something beyond conclusory
bromides when important individual interests are at stake and have not had
appropriate airing in the democratic process. We see those themes again in his
McDonald opinion. Referring by way of example to the Court's refusal to
establish a right to physician-assisted suicide, he wrote: "If a particular liberty
interest is already being given careful consideration in, and subjected to ongoing calibration by, the States, judicial enforcement may not be appropriate."" In
contrast, however, Justice Stevens explained that "[the Court] ha[s] long appreciated that more 'searching' judicial review may be justified when the rights of
'discrete and insular minorities'-groups that may face systematic barriers in
the political system-are at stake."
Legality and proportionality in the strict sense (in other words, balancing) are
natural, if not obvious, allies, and there is sense in their pairing within the
jurisprudence of so many courts, and of Justice Stevens. According to Moshe
Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, in Germany-where proportionality is said to have

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 75.
427 U.S. 495, 516, 520 (1976) (Steven, J., dissenting).
Id. at 497-99, 516 (majority opinion).
See id. at 517-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519-20.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3101 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
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originated 6 6-balancing was, as it is in the United States,6' associated with
antiformalism, whereas the legalistic elements of proportionality analysis sat
"within the framework of mainstream German formal thought."68 But justices
of standards, who tend to support balancing, may well view a commitment to
legality as their principal form of discipline. Proportionality emerges from a
tradition in which, in contrast to the narrative Justice Scalia tends to push, 6 9 the
concern is that judges will be tempted to support the sovereign, not individual
rights claimants.7 0 Proportionality, then, is a strategy for incorporating the rule
of law into a system of workable government: it is, in a sense, a law of
standards.
It is fitting that McDonald was the case in which Justice Stevens offered the
most complete articulation of his judicial philosophy. McDonald extended
Districtof Columbia v. Heller's holding that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense to laws passed by state
and local governments. Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Heller rejected an
interest-balancing approach in the clearest terms, 7 2 and Justice Alito's plurality
opinion in McDonald reaffirmed that rejection. But Heller and McDonald
underscore the perils of rules-based jurisprudence. After two lengthy opinions,
we still do not know the standard of review for laws that arguably infringe on
Second Amendment rights. What we do know is that whatever rule the Court
was announcing in Heller and reiterating in McDonald is one that invalidates a
handgun ban in the District of Columbia, but is not bothered by laws regulating
the carrying of guns in sensitive areas like schools and government buildings,
the commercial sale of firearms, or the denial of guns to former convicts or the
mentally ill. 7 4
From a rules perspective, this regime is difficult to understand. The articulable rule that could produce this jurisprudence is elusive, unless it is a rule of
(dare I say, Solomonic) common sense. As Justice Stevens wrote many years
ago in an entirely different case, "[1]ike many bright-line rules, the categorical
rule established in this case is only 'categorical' for a page or two in the U.S.

66. Grimm, supra note 23 ("From Germany the principle of proportionality spread to most other
European countries with a system of judicial review, and to a number of jurisdictions outside Europe.");
Sweet & Mathews, supra note 22, at 98-104 (describing the early development of proportionality
analysis in Germany in the late eighteenth century).
67. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 949

(1987).
68. Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, American Balancing and German Proportionality: The
Historical Origins,8 INT'L J. CoNsT. L. 263, 275 (2010).

69. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
70. See Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 68, at 273-74 (discussing the link between proportionality
in the exercise of police power and natural rights).
71. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (plurality opinion).
72. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
73. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
74. See id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
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Reports."7 It is not surprising that a jurisprudence of gun rights would produce
a set of common-sense exceptions to full enforcement, given the sovereign's
existential interest in retaining its monopoly over the lawful use of violence.
Balancing is inevitable in a well-functioning democracy, and in no other area of
law is that more evident. Judges may conduct that balancing forthrightly, and
with serious attention to substantive and procedural constraints on government
action, as many forms of proportionality analysis require. Or they may do so
through rules that (necessarily) either under-protect rights or find themselves
bent into uncouth shapes. For Justice Stevens, the choice has long been pellucidly clear.

75. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1067 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Cf. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "subjective judgments"
may be "buried" in Justice Scalia's approach, but that with his own approach, "the judge's cards are
laid on the table for all to see, and to critique").

